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Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation  of  manufacturing  into  highly  integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing  of  some  of  the  conventional  wisdom  regarding  the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
The global economic crisis has forced a major rethinking of the respective roles of governments and markets in the
processes of trade and growth. Indeed, industrial policy seems to be back in fashion—or, at least, talking about it is.
But a renewed “activism” by government in the trade and growth agenda need not mean a return to old-style
policies of import substitution and “picking winners.” Instead, it may mean a stronger focus on competitiveness by
unlocking the constraints to private sector–led growth. This note discusses the renewed role of government in trade
and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.
Avoiding the Eye of the Storm: How to Deal Effectively  
with Job Crises
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Although economic crises are difficult to predict, their recurrence is a salient feature of emerging market economies. Neverthe-
less, many developing countries continue to lack an effective policy infrastructure that can mitigate the impacts of economic 
downturns on employment opportunities without affecting long-term growth prospects. This was painfully highlighted by the 
hasty reactions implemented by many countries in response to the global downturn of 2008–9, and by the ad hoc and 
reactive nature of many of the policies implemented. The weak ability of governments to systematically foresee, monitor, and 
offset adverse labor market impacts of economic downturns is of particular concern in developing countries where poverty 
incidence is high and labor is typically the only asset for the majority of the population (Lustig 2000). The main objectives of 
this note1 are (i) to highlight the need for policies that limit earnings volatility and (ii) to guide policy makers through the 
challenges inherent in crafting effective and comprehensive policy packages. 
Creative or Destructive Destruction: The 
Need for Policy Interventions
A host  of  macroeconomic  models  dating  from  Schumpeter 
(1939) imply that negative shocks can foster “creative destruc-
tion” by weeding out unproductive firms and workers. Howev-
er, previous crises show that when markets are imperfect (as is 
predominantly the case in developing countries), even short-
lived shocks can have destructive long-term consequences for 
aggregate productivity and individual workers’ earnings and 
welfare. Households facing income losses may be forced to take 
children out of school, spend less on health, or cut back on ca-
loric consumption and productive assets (for example, livestock 
or household enterprise inventories), leading to future losses in 
income, welfare, and productivity (Ferreira and Schady 2009; 
Fafchamps 2003; Dercon 2001). Crises can also lead to excess 
cleansing and can destroy potentially efficient and innovative 
firms as they may be the most credit constrained (Barlevy 2002, 
2003; Ouyang 2009; Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers 2010). 
Unmanaged, crises can thus result in irreversible productiv-
ity losses and damage long-term prospects for growth and pov-
erty reduction. Moreover, even when structural changes en-
hance productivity, the burden of the adjustment is likely to fall 
disproportionately on the most vulnerable. Therefore maximiz-
ing development potential requires effective crises management 
through policies that reduce the negative short-term impacts of 
economic downturns on employment, earnings and household 
income, and at the same time foster recovery. This note offers an 
overview of some the principal issues in formulating effective 
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Constraints and T rade-offs
Most developing countries struck by a jobs crisis face three pol-
icy constraints. First, monitoring systems and high frequency 
labor market indicators are largely lacking, and decisions often 
need to be made against a backdrop of extreme uncertainty as 
to who is hit the hardest and how. Second, the fiscal space for 
policy intervention is often narrow and shrinking. Third, poli-
cy makers may be confronted by institutional and political 
economy constraints, such as few preexisting social insurance 
mechanisms on which to build, limited administrative capaci-
ty, and little maneuvering space to pursue economically opti-
mal, yet politically unpopular, reforms. 
The extent to which these constraints are binding will vary 
across countries and over time and policies must be based on an 
assessment of how best to work around these country-specific 
constraints. For example, if lack of information or institutional 
capacity makes it difficult to identify the groups hardest hit by 
crisis, policy makers may opt for public works programs that 
rely on self-selection. Moreover, in the recent crisis for example, 
countries with fiscally sound outlooks in Asia and, to a lesser 
extent, Latin America have been able to implement large coun-
tercyclical packages, but many other countries, especially in Eu-
rope and Central Asia and Africa, had limited fiscal scope for 
such responses. And even in the context of shrinking fiscal 
space, expanded safety net spending may make sense, because 
targeted assistance is likely to result in higher consumption. 
Policy makers also face two thorny trade-offs. First, policies 
that ease the short-term impacts on employment may destroy 
incentives for long-term recovery, especially during a prolonged, 
structural  crisis  involving  significant  sectoral  reallocation. 
Countercyclical policies that focus on protecting employment 
levels in unviable firms and sectors may undermine a country’s 
medium-term competitiveness, distort adjustment, and lead to 
increases in public debt, all of which would hurt long-term 
growth prospects. In Indonesia, the 1998 crisis sparked pro-la-
bor pressures that led to better enforcement of minimum wag-
es and the introduction of severance pay and dismissal regula-
tions. More stringent regulation helped raise the earnings and 
employment  stability  of  manufacturing  workers,  but  ham-
pered the overall recovery of jobs (Manning 2000; Narjoko and 
Hill 2007). In such a setting, policy interventions should in-
stead be designed to facilitate, rather than hamper, the required 
transformation. However, such a trade-off does not always ex-
ist. Policies to smooth the transition can still yield high payoffs 
by mitigating excess cleansing, preserving human capital accu-
mulation, and encouraging continued innovation. 
Limited resources mean that policy makers may also have to 
choose between support for those most directly affected by the 
crisis—typically urban-based exporters, construction, manu-
facturing—and protection of the most vulnerable—typically 
the chronically poor. If first-round labor market adjustments 
are concentrated in specific geographic areas or sectors, target-
ing interventions to those areas or sectors may be needed. How-
ever, it is also important to consider the likely impact of second-
round labor market adjustment on earnings, in particular for 
the most vulnerable. Evidence from recent financial crises, in-
cluding the 1994 Mexican Tequila crisis and the 1997 East 
Asian crisis, suggest that shocks rapidly spread from directly af-
fected sectors to other parts of the economy and that the poor, 
because of their smaller margins and higher vulnerability, suf-
fer the most severe welfare losses. Moreover, as the case of Indo-
nesia shows, the trade-off can raise political economy problems, 
precisely because the poorest have little political voice. 
A Useful Policy Typology
Government interventions to minimize the adverse impact of 
crises on labor markets can broadly be separated into four cate-
gories along two dimensions depending on (i) whether their 
main objective is to contain the impact of the crisis in the short-
run or to accelerate recovery and promote long-term growth, 
and (ii) whether they promote/sustain labor demand or protect 
household  income.  Policies  to  contain  short-term  impact 
should typically be temporary, or at least possible to scale up 
during a crisis and scaled down as recovery begins; automatic 
stabilizers such as unemployment insurance or cash transfers 
also fall within this category. Policy interventions to accelerate 
recovery tend to be more permanent and take aim at structural 
market imperfections, for example, skills development, credit 
policies, and broader investment climate interventions. 
Careful and comprehensive policy design is needed to resolve 
a potential tension between the two categories. Structural re-
forms may cause excessive cleansing and unnecessarily depress 
output and labor income in the short run, while short-term pol-
icies to protect jobs may hamper job creation in the long run. But 
there are also win-win policies that are beneficial both in the 
short and the long run. Figure 1 presents a rough grouping of 
commonly used policy interventions. The categorization is not 
rigid—policies may fit into various categories—but provides an 
overview of the potential trade-offs policy makers need to know. 
What Policies Have Worked? 
Three broad lessons emerge from the literature on policy re-
sponses in previous crises (Paci, Revenga and Rijkers 2010). 
First, no single set of policies will work everywhere, and at all 
times. Policy interventions need to be tailored to country-spe-
cific circumstances, including the nature of the shock, the fiscal 
space, institutional capacity, and political economy. Second, 
comprehensive policy packages beat piecemeal responses be-
cause of synergy and complementarity. Third, “on the run” 
policy making is no substitute for sound, existing institutions. 
In practice, many policy interventions have yielded limited re-
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with  implementing  incentive-compatible  packages  from 
scratch (Paci, Revenga and Rijkers 2010). Expanding existing 
programs is likely to be a more effective strategy than imple-
menting new and untested programs (World Bank 2008). Dur-
ing the 1998 Russian crisis, for instance, while the safety net 
fell short of fully protecting living standards, it helped provide 
protection against poverty (Ravallion and Loshkin 2000). In 
addition, some tentative messages are emerging from the litera-
ture on which policies are most likely to be effective in achiev-
ing different policy objectives. 
Policies designed to contain short-term impact 
Protecting existing jobs and providing “replacement jobs” 
Temporary payroll, tax holidays, and wage subsidies can help to 
limit short-term labor retrenchment and can be targeted to vul-
nerable groups. But such schemes (i) affect workers in the for-
mal sector only; (ii) typically result in high costs per job created/
maintained; and (iii) can run up against political economy con-
straints. For example, in Argentina, union opposition to flexi-
ble employment contracts for youth and women in the wake of 
the 1995 crisis resulted in the elimination of most of the pro-
gram. But this program may be more effective if targeted at 
small firms rather than capital-intensive firms (Abrahart, Kaur, 
and Tzannatos 2000; Kang and others 2001). 
Public work programs have been used widely in past crises, 
such as in Latin America and Asia, and are also the most com-
mon response to the current crisis (ILO 2009). Appropriately 
designed programs provide a fairly efficient instrument for tar-
geting earnings vulnerability because a low wage ensures that 
the scheme is attractive for the poor only, and during crises only 
(Ravallion 2008; del Ninno, Subbarao, and Milazzo 2009). 
However, their cost-effectiveness depends on budget leverage, 
labor intensity, overhead costs for supervision, and targeting 
performance, which need to be weighed against other means, 
such as direct transfers. 
Maintaining labor-related income 
Extending unemployment benefits or using them to cover re-
duced hours and part-time training has been a common re-
Figure 1. Commonly Used Policy Interventions
Source: Paci, Revenga, and Rijkers (2010).  
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sponse to the current jobs crisis (ILO 2009). Unemployment 
insurance may be appropriate when formal sector workers are 
most affected, when adjustment occurs through jobs rather 
than earnings, and governments have the fiscal and institution-
al capacity to design, implement, monitor, and target benefits. 
Many countries do not, however, and only a small number of 
developing countries have a comprehensive and effective sys-
tem of unemployment benefits in place. Even in such coun-
tries, like Chile, unemployment insurance has been comple-
mented by public works schemes. 
When labor market adjustments take place through reduc-
tion in earnings rather than job destruction, targeted cash trans-
fers can also provide a more cost-effective means of compensat-
ing the vulnerable: they have relatively low administrative costs 
and do not distort prices. There are drawbacks to the targeted 
transfers, however: they cannot rely on self-selection and politi-
cal pressures may potentially make a scaling back of temporary 
programs impossible once the crisis is over. 
Policies designed to accelerate recovery and promote growth 
Job creation and imperfect markets 
While there is evidence that weaknesses in the investment cli-
mate hamper growth and job creation in stable times, there is 
no evidence on the impact of business and labor market policies 
during crises. Job search assistance schemes, for example, may ef-
fectively address information gaps that constrain employment 
during normal times, but are not likely to work during times of 
mass unemployment (Betcherman and others 2004). 
Improving employability 
The impact of training programs to enhance worker productivi-
ty has been limited, although it strongly depends on context 
and implementation (Auer, Efendioglu, and Leschke 2008). 
Training also seems to be most effective when used in conjunc-
tion with other policies. Overall, training policies risk exclud-
ing the most vulnerable and least productive workers. 
Self-employment assistance programs likewise often show low 
cost-effectiveness and limited outreach. This is because assisted 
enterprises drive out other potentially more efficient enterpris-
es (new or incumbent) from the market and program beneficia-
ries include entrepreneurially skilled persons who would have 
started up their own enterprises anyway—and their outreach 
tends to be very limited. They can be more promising when 
targeted at particular groups such as women and older individ-
uals (Auer, Efendioglu, and Leschke 2008; Abrahart, Kaur, and 
Tzannatos 2000). 
Win-win policies 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs provide cash trans-
fers conditional upon investments by households in education 
and health that in turn should benefit productivity and growth 
over  the  long  run.  Mexico’s  Oportunidades  and  Indonesia’s 
scholarship program Jaring Pengamanan Sosial show CCTs can 
protect poor children’s school enrollment in times of shocks. 
However,  poorly  designed  schemes  can  exclude  the  most 
vulnerable, such as those who do not have access to the public 
services  that  transfers  are  conditioned  upon  (Fizbein  and 
Schady 2009). Where cash transfer programs are not in place, 
as  in  many  low-income  countries,  conditional  schemes  are 
likely to take longer to implement than unconditional schemes. 
As a crisis response, targeted unconditional cash transfers may 
then yield better results. 
Credit market policies have shown some promise in resolving 
cash-flow problems in otherwise viable firms, thus protecting 
them from going out of business. But credit policies can result 
in substantial incentive problems. In Japan, banks levied addi-
tional credit to the weakest firms to avoid balance sheet prob-
lems, leaving more viable firms to exit, and stifling economic 
recovery. Quick fixes such as loan forgiveness, subsidized lend-
ing, and interest caps risk limiting long-term access to financ-
ing. Microfinance schemes may work better in contexts of high 
self-employment and informality. In Indonesia, microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) appear to have been very resilient to the 
East Asian crisis because of their specific design features. How-
ever, there are other cases where MFI lending has been procycli-
cal and has exacerbated crisis situations (Marconi and Mosley 
2006). 
Productivity-enhancing public works schemes, finally, also fit 
into this category. Cost-efficient schemes that provide public/
community goods can protect labor income while simultane-
ously reducing vulnerability and increase income growth in the 
future. 
Conclusions: Prepare, Preserve, and Ex-
pand Policies That Work 
Events of the last two years have reminded us that crises are a 
recurring phenomenon with deep and protracted impacts on 
labor markets. Designing, implementing, and evaluating sound 
policies ex ante is a more effective crisis coping strategy than 
scrambling for responses ex post. Good policies and institu-
tions—prudent fiscal management, reliable labor market infor-
mation systems, flexible labor market regulations, well-func-
tioning  credit  markets,  and  sound  safety  net  systems—can 
provide the basis for a coordinated and coherent response to a 
crisis, while maximizing future growth prospects. For countries 
in need of additional policies, crises can provide an opportune 
time to institute needed safety nets. Experiences with previous 
and recent crises have clearly shown that having a system of au-
tomatic stabilizers in place to mitigate the impact of the crisis is 
not a luxury. It is a necessity to avoid considerable long-term 
costs in terms of foregone growth prospects. Automatic stabiliz-
ers are particularly vital for countries where a large proportion 
of the population is in poverty or highly vulnerable. 
Efficient and effective policy making and crisis response re-
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also shown the importance of being better prepared on the ana-
lytical front. First, increasing the collection and availability of 
high frequency data is critical for monitoring the impact of cri-
ses and policy responses on labor markets. Second, it is impor-
tant to be prepared by evaluating the vast amount of policy re-
sponses  undertaken  to  the  current  crisis  and  identifying 
effective policies and by developing simulation tools to assess 
impacts ex ante. The repeated crises faced by the developing 
world should act as catalysts for an increased global effort to put 
in place efficient policy systems and high frequency data collec-
tion to monitor labor market outcomes.
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